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Abstract 
 
In Indonesia, Chinese voluntary associations took on a new level of importance after the fall of Suharto’s 
New Order regime in 1998 that ushered in a revival of Chinese identity politics. At the same time, Sino-
Indonesian relations are blossoming, and the rise of China as a global power means that Indonesia can 
only benefit from stronger ties with China in the future. In this new atmosphere of cooperation, I argue 
that Chinese Indonesian individuals and voluntary organizations play a crucial function as trade and 
cultural intermediaries. Drawing on both empirical and qualitative fieldwork data, in this paper, I examine 
how members of Chinese voluntary organizations view their ethnicity, national belonging, and strategic 
position in the contexts of post-Suharto Chinese identity politics and Sino-Indonesia relations. More 
broadly, this paper also offers a critical analysis of the internal dynamics of contemporary Overseas 
Chinese voluntary organizations and the role they play in building trade and sociocultural relationships 
between China and other countries. 
 
 
As has been frequently noted by scholars, along with Chinese schools and media, Chinese voluntary 
associations1 (shetuan) have long been regarded as one of the ‘three pillars’ that play a significant role in 
the shaping of the worldwide Overseas Chinese community. Different from clan organizations (huiguan) 
that predominantly facilitate cultural functions and traditional roles, voluntary associations act more as a 
hub in which members can socialize and build local and transnational guanxi (personal/kin relationship) 
networks. Since members of these associations are often influential and well-connected ethnic Chinese 
businessmen, in many Overseas Chinese communities, voluntary associations become unofficial 
chambers of commerce that facilitate a substantial portion of trade and investments with China. 
 
In Indonesia, Chinese voluntary associations took on a new level of importance after the fall of Suharto’s 
New Order regime in 1998 that ushered in a revival of Chinese identity politics. In an era where 
expressions of Chineseness are no longer forbidden, many within these associations have actively re-
established cultural, emotional and socio-economic ties with China, resulting in a phenomenon commonly 
termed ‘re-Sinification’.2 At the same time, Sino–Indonesian relations at all levels have been blossoming 
in the last two decades, and the rise of China as a global power means that Indonesia can only benefit 
from stronger ties with China in the future. Within this new era of cooperation and in light of China’s 
recent soft-power efforts in Southeast Asia, Chinese Indonesian individuals and voluntary organizations 
  
 
play an important function as trade and cultural intermediaries. This means that for the first time in 
decades, Chineseness has become a valuable social capital rather than a political liability. 
 
Drawing mainly on qualitative fieldwork data, in this article I examine how members of Chinese 
voluntary organizations view their ethnicity, national belonging and strategic position in the contexts of 
post-Suharto Chinese identity politics, Sino–Indonesia relations and China’s foreign policy in the region. 
A central focus in this article is on when and how leaders and members of Chinese Indonesian shetuan 
utilize their Chinese ethnicity and Mandarin language abilities as strategic assets in placing themselves as 
important players in Sino–Indonesian relations. However, more broadly, this article also offers a critical 
analysis of the internal dynamics of contemporary Overseas Chinese voluntary organizations and the role 
they play in building trade and socio-cultural relationships between China and other countries. The article 
begins with a brief historical overview of Chinese social organizations in Indonesia in order to provide 
context to the internal and external dynamics of contemporary Chinese Indonesian voluntary associations. 
History, Erasure and the ‘Return’ of Chinese Associations in Indonesia 
 
The social construction of Chinese Indonesians as ‘asing’ (foreign) and ‘non-pribumi’ (non-native) has a 
long historical precedence that began during the colonial period when the Dutch racially categorized the 
heterogeneous Chinese population in a single racial category of ‘foreign Orientals’ (vreemde Osterlingen) 
who were higher in societal class compared to the pribumi population within the colonial hierarchy. The 
fact that many Chinese served as middlemen for the Dutch in their trade dealings with the pribumi 
perpetuated their negative image as opportunistic economic animals who profited from pribumi suffering. 
Politically weak and loathed for their perceived economic dominance, the ethnic Chinese became easy 
victims of racialized violence and riots that would flare up during episodes of political or economic 
instability in the colonial and post-independence eras. 
 
In terms of social organization, like in other Overseas Chinese diaspora, Chinese migrants in the Dutch 
East Indies began loosely organizing themselves within both formal and informal associations as soon as 
their numbers reached a significant mass following the wave of migration from southern China in the 
early 1700s. By 1740, it was estimated that the number of Chinese who resided in Batavia (now Jakarta) 
had reached at least 10,000 both inside and outside of the city walls, and they congregated in groups 
based on common kinship, ethno-linguistic and ancestral hometown affiliations.3 Within the colonial 
system of governance however, the Dutch imposed the Chinese Captain (kapitan) system as a means of 
controlling the Chinese population.4 Chosen from the wealthiest and most influential members of the 
population, Chinese Captains were supposed to represent the elite of their society. Indeed, the majority of 
these Captains—such as the Hakka business tycoon Tjong A Fie in Medan—closely cooperated with the 
colonial administration by acting as revenue farmers, property magnates or entrepreneurs in plantations 
and sugar mills. Chinese Captains were also usually respected leaders of ethno-linguistic groups and had 
vast business networks in the Nanyang and beyond. 
 
By the early twentieth century however, the Chinese Captain system had attracted much criticism, 
particularly in the context of anti-colonial resistance and the rise of Chinese nationalism in the Nanyang 
Overseas Chinese communities. Indeed, by the early 1900s, Indies Chinese society had become much 
  
 
more culturally and politically diverse, not least because of the second big wave of migration from 
southern China around the turn of the twentieth century. The Captain system eventually lost relevance and 
was abolished, and as a replacement, the Dutch tried to create the Office for Chinese Affairs, subject to 
the Ministry of Interior assigned to keep track of political and other social trends among the Chinese.5 
New organizations such as the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) were established to promote an 
‘awakening’ of Chinese culture (a re-Sinification) and support modern Chinese language education in the 
Indies. Along with chambers of commerce (shangsui) that opened in major cities, these new organizations 
were deemed to better represent the interests of an increasingly self-aware community, particularly those 
who are new, China-born arrivals or the totok (pure) Chinese. 
 
An important feature of Chinese social organization in the early twentieth century was the social, cultural, 
economic and political tension between the newly arrived totok and the more established peranakan 
(acculturated) Chinese. Shedding light on the heterogeneity of Chinese communities in Indonesia, 
differences in language, education and cultural orientation eventually led to the two groups establishing 
their own associations. Totok Chinese dominated chambers of commerce that were generally culturally 
and politically oriented towards China while the peranakan formed Dutch-speaking groups with divided 
political orientations.6 This internal diversity is made even more complex by the existence of temple 
groups, community institutions and transnational ‘secret societies’ that each had their own governing 
committees and is often divided according to speech group or clan interests.7 These associations also 
faced problems as local Chinese took sides in the Civil War in China, some remaining loyal to the 
Nationalists (Guomindang), although by 1949 a greater number chose to support the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). In addition, before the end of Indonesia’s revolution in 1949, it became clear that—if 
forced to choose—most local-born and locally oriented peranakan would choose to become citizens in an 
independent Indonesian state, complicating the political picture of the group.8  
 
However, while linguistic, socio-cultural and political differences continued to divide different Chinese 
groups, a pattern that existed was that they would band together during times of hardship and political 
threat. For instance, through associations such as Chunghua Tsunghui, the Chinese presented quite a 
strong united front in representing the Chinese community as a whole in dealings with the Dutch and the 
new Indonesian Republican government during the Indonesian Revolution from 1945 to 1949.9 More 
importantly, the Chinese needed to help each other in the face of anti-Chinese sentiments and periodic 
pogroms. Indeed, as has been well documented by scholars, the negative perception of Chinese 
Indonesians as ‘non-pribumi’ (non-native) has a long historical precedence that began during the colonial 
period. The fact that many Chinese served as middlemen for the Dutch in oppressive trade dealings with 
the pribumi left a lasting monolithic image of the Chinese as foreign, opportunistic economic animals 
who profited from pribumi suffering. As Anthony Reid argues, during the independence struggle and 
early days of the Indonesian Republic, the position of the ethnic Chinese as ‘foreigners within’ made 
them ‘one of the most important “Others” against which the new national identities defined themselves’.10  
 
The issue of foreignness and loyalty reached a critical point in 1955 when the PRC and Indonesia signed a 
Dual Nationality Treaty, which provisioned the ability for dual national Chinese Indonesians who wished 
to solely remain as Indonesian citizens to renounce their Chinese citizenship.11 However, despite the fact 
that two-thirds of those with rightful claims to Chinese citizenship chose to become Indonesian citizens, 
the ‘Chinese problem’ persisted in the ultra-nationalist rhetoric and culminated in the enactment of the 
  
 
Presidential Regulation Number 10 in November 1959 that banned retail trade by non-indigenous persons 
in rural areas. In response to the brewing anti-Chinese sentiment, integrationist movements such as the 
Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship, 
BAPERKI) under the leadership of Indonesian nationalist Siauw Giok Tjhan began to gather interest in 
1963. However, BAPERKI’s perceived left political leanings and closeness with the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) proved to be its downfall when the PKI was systematically exterminated 
following the alleged abortive Communist coup of 30 September 1965 (G-30S/PKI). 
 
In the bloodbath that followed, it is estimated that at least 500,000 alleged Communist sympathizers 
(including many ethnic Chinese) were killed,12 the PKI outlawed, and BAPERKI was disbanded.13 
Suharto’s New Order regime quickly found a ‘solution’ to the Chinese problem by implementing a policy 
of cultural assimilation in 1967, banning all Chinese organizations, schools, public displays of Chinese 
culture and public use of Chinese languages.14 At the same time, the New Order government ‘suspended’ 
bilateral relations with the PRC on 30 October 1967 over the PRC’s alleged support towards the G-
30S/PKI abortive coup. Bilateral channels with the PRC were not officially re-established again until 
1989, which meant that for over two decades, Chinese Indonesians could not have official institutional 
connections with China. This severing of diplomatic ties with China created a potent image among both 
Chinese and pribumi Indonesians that possessing links or closeness with the PRC was politically ‘dirty’. 
 
Over the three decades of assimilation from 1966 to 1998, Chinese Indonesian culture and identity were 
in many ways ‘erased’ or at least hidden from public view, although their forced assimilation also had the 
paradoxical effect of accentuating the group’s essential foreignness in the national imagination. Chinese 
socio-political activism officially ceased to exist during the New Order, and the only associations that 
were allowed to operate were temple and other religious organizations.15 However, this did not mean that 
Chinese associations and guanxi ties ceased to exist during the New Order. Chinese Indonesian 
businessmen—particularly those who were close to Suharto, such as Liem Sioe Liong and Djuhar 
Sutanto—continued to maintain influential networks both domestically and abroad. In fact, as Liu Hong 
noted, Chinese Indonesian tycoons like Liem and Sutanto were influential leaders in various local and 
international shetuan, particularly those organized around Fuqing clan associations.16  
 
The situation changed dramatically when, after months of economic crisis, political instability and student 
protests demanding the resignation of President Suharto, the chaos culminated in large-scale lootings, 
destruction of properties and rape of ethnic Chinese women between 12 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta, Solo 
and other major cities.17  
 
Soon after, the New Order regime collapsed and a new era of reform (reformasi) began. For Chinese 
Indonesians, the end of the New Order marked the beginning of a new Chinese identity politics that 
started with demands for the abolition of assimilationist laws and justice for the victims of the May ‘98 
rapes and riots.18 Post-Suharto governments were only too eager to prove their commitment to human 
rights issues and move away from the dark legacies of the New Order and May 1998 by implementing 
new laws that recognized the rights of Chinese Indonesians. The Habibie government (1998–1999) started 
off these reforms through a Presidential Instruction that abolished the use of the terms ‘pribumi’ and ‘non-
  
 
pribumi’ in official government documents. In the year 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid revoked 
bans against Chinese languages, religion and cultural expressions, allowing Chinese culture to be 
practiced in public once more.19  
 
Immediately after the May ‘98 tragedy, a phenomenal number of Chinese political parties and social 
organizations emerged ‘like mushrooms after spring rain’.20 By 2007, it was estimated that at least 176 
Chinese voluntary associations existed in Indonesia, the majority of those being clan associations that 
have re-surfaced.21 Critically examining the reasons behind this, Ariel Heryanto suggests that the desire to 
form or join ethnic-based political parties or social organizations carries some symbolic and emotional 
value, expressing a long-repressed desire for public recognition and an emotional response to the 
racialized violence of 1998.22 However, the author would add that a more pragmatic reason was the 
realization among Chinese Indonesian leaders that they needed to cease the momentum and once again 
gain a collective political position in order to avoid being in such a dangerously vulnerable position. 
 
A number of these associations have had some success advocating for recognition of Chinese Indonesian 
rights. For example, Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian Association, INTI), together 
with the now defunct Chinese Indonesian Political Party (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PARTI) and the 
Anti-Discrimination Movement (Gerakan Anti Diskriminasi, GANDI) were instrumental in the abolition 
in 2000 of Presidential Decree No. 14/1967 that banned all public displays of Chinese cultural 
expressions, and in the installment of new Citizenship Law No. 12/2006 that recognizes all Indonesian-
born ethnic Chinese as Indonesian citizens. On the cultural front, Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa 
Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Social Organization, PSMTI) has successfully established the Chinese 
Indonesian exhibit (Taman Budaya Tionghoa) at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Mini Indonesia Park), 
while the Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia (Majelis Tinggi Agama Konghucu 
Indonesia, MATAKIN) has also been successful in pushing for the recognition of Chinese New Year as a 
religious Confucian national holiday in Indonesia. 
 
Externally yet just as importantly, the burgeoning diplomatic and trade relations between Indonesia and 
the PRC have created an increasingly China-friendly environment in post-Suharto Indonesia, at least at 
the governmental and business levels. Sino–Indonesian relations strengthened considerably both 
symbolically and substantively under the Yudhoyono years as both countries went from strategic partners 
in 2005 to comprehensive strategic partners in 2013. More recently, both Chinese President Xi Jinping 
and Indonesian President Joko Widodo have paid mutual state visits, and at bilateral talks, officials from 
the two countries have been discussing how Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine could 
potentially complement Beijing’s Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road vision, which would include 
China and AIIB-sponsored building of ports and maritime toll ways in Indonesia. 
 
As will be elaborated further in the following sections, within this new atmosphere of bilateral 
cooperation, Chinese Indonesian individuals, businesses and shetuan are valuable players who also 
benefit from their strategic position as intermediaries. This is of course not to say that Chinese 
Indonesians play a mediating role in all Sino–Indonesian interactions. It needs to be remembered that 
much of the mediation occurs at the high-level government-to-government level and that Mainland 
  
 
Chinese businesses also interact with pribumi-owned enterprises. However, it cannot be denied that, 
through individual and group efforts, Chinese Indonesians possess an advantage from their ability to 
engage in guanxi networking with Chinese counterparts in the Mainland. Especially in the last decade, 
this is certainly an advantage that many shetuan members are capitalizing on. 
 
Re-Sinification and the Internal Dynamics of Contemporary Chinese Indonesian Voluntary 
Associations 
 
Today, over 15 years after the beginning of the reformasi era, the role of Chinese voluntary associations 
has changed. Now that there is little domestic lobbying left to be done in terms of recognition of ethnic 
Chinese rights, the majority of voluntary associations have largely turned their attention to philanthropic 
and cultural activities.23 For instance, INTI frequently organizes relief efforts for disaster-struck areas and 
provides free medical clinics for residents of poor urban and rural neighborhoods. Larger organizations 
maintain a close relationship with government leaders, and every Chinese New Year, the Indonesian 
President makes an appearance at the large-scale celebrations hosted by INTI, PSMTI or MATAKIN. 
 
In the absence of a major common cause to fight for, many of the associations’ members—particularly 
the younger members—lose interest and a large number of associations became dormant or even defunct. 
The majority of Chinese Indonesians who continued to be active in the associations are older generation 
(over 60 years old) totok business elite who had at least some experience of Mandarin-language schooling 
before Chinese schools were closed in 1967.24 As will be discussed later in the article, the mainly totok 
demographic profile of Chinese Indonesian shetuan members partly accounts for the increasing use of 
Mandarin in shetuan events. Furthermore, the associations that remained mostly serve ceremonial 
purposes (such as Chinese New Year celebrations, annual general meetings and May ‘98 commemoration 
events), and this has dismayed many former members who accuse the associations of losing the initial 
passion towards fighting against anti-Chinese discrimination. For instance, Anton,25 a former early 
member of INTI and PSMTI who was also a student demonstrator in 1998, complained that, nowadays, 
Chinese Indonesian associations have become ‘weak’. Anton elaborates: 
 
In 1998 when we first began forming organizations, everyone was passionate about fighting 
together and we achieved much … But now they [the associations’ elders] are only concerned 
with ceremonial events where they get to take group photos and shake hands with government 
officials … Their events are now all about welcoming trade delegations from China, and also to 
promote their own businesses. Us former members joke that Chinese Indonesian events are now 
just like trade shows.26  
 
Anton’s expression of discontent is reflective of common recent criticisms toward Chinese Indonesian 
associations. 
 
  
 
Along with complaints about associations’ lack of activism beyond ceremonial functions, increasingly, 
Chinese Indonesian shetuan are criticized for being too commercial. Indeed, more and more, Chinese 
Indonesian associations play a chamber of commerce function by re-establishing and strengthening 
connections with ancestral regions in China (qiaoxiang) and the global network of Overseas Chinese 
associations for both commercial and cultural purposes. Because of this chamber of commerce function, 
disenchanted former members and other critical observers have heavily criticized elders of Chinese 
Indonesian associations for allegedly using their leadership positions for personal gains. This accusation 
is amplified by the fact that leaders of Chinese Indonesian shetuan are more often than not influential 
businessmen who hold multiple leadership positions in various associations and have much to gain from 
the guanxi networks forged through their involvement in the shetuan. 
 
Furthermore, perhaps the most important trend to be observed among Chinese Indonesian shetuan in the 
last decade has been the increasing use of Mandarin as a lingua franca at Chinese Indonesian gatherings 
and events. This can be observed not just in urban centers such as Jakarta and Surabaya, but also 
increasingly in rural areas with large ethnic Chinese populations such as West Kalimantan and North 
Sumatra where the dominant Chinese languages were traditionally Hakka and Hokkien respectively. As 
will be discussed later in this article, this increasing use of Mandarin is part of a greater trend of 
Sinification, not just among Chinese Indonesian associations, but also among many Chinese Indonesians 
more generally, particularly those from the totok business elite. The author argues that these shifts in the 
internal dynamics of Chinese Indonesian shetuan are fundamentally linked to three factors: the changing 
landscape of ethnic Chinese politics in Indonesia; the friendly climate of Sino-Indonesian relations; and 
the rise of China in the Asian region. 
 
From Local Civil Society Organizations to Transnational Chambers of Commerce? 
 
Nowadays, along with cultural and philanthropic activities, associations such as INTI and PSMTI host 
many Chinese trade delegations that visit Indonesia as well as conducting visits to both cities and 
provincial areas in China. For example, in their May 2014 newsletter, PSMTI reported that a delegation 
from the association went on a visit to Beijing, Henan and Guangdong at the invitation of the Chinese 
government-sponsored Chinese Overseas Exchange Association (COEA). Similar tours are also 
organized by organizations such as INTI as well as clan and religious associations, mostly to qiaoxiang 
regions in Fujian and Guangdong. However, while these tours are officially termed ‘cultural exchange’ or 
‘ancestral village pilgrimage’ tours, they also serve as opportunities for members of the Chinese 
Indonesian shetuan to form potential business or investment networks with businessmen, regional 
government officials and local chambers of commerce in China. 
 
According to INTI’s Chairman Rachman Hakim, as the largest Chinese shetuan in Indonesia, commercial 
activities are not part of INTI’s organizational agenda.27 However, Mr Hakim could not deny that, as an 
association with many entrepreneurs and business people as members, there would be those who take 
advantage of INTI’s vast internal and external networks to further their own businesses. As long as the 
networking activities do not interfere with INTI’s mission of encouraging Chinese Indonesians to 
  
 
contribute positively to nation building in Indonesia, then there is no harm in ‘hitting two birds with one 
stone’. 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, those who are critical of Chinese Indonesian shetuan’s commercial 
activities point to the fact that association elders like Rachman Hakim hold multiple key positions within 
various shetuan. For instance, as well as holding the Chairmanship of INTI, Mr Hakim—who is a 
successful businessman—is also Vice President of Perhimpunan Pengusaha Indonesia Tionghoa 
(Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association, PERPIT), a relatively new business association set up 
specifically to facilitate trade cooperation and investment between Chinese and Indonesian businesses. 
There are many other individuals who have become influential players within Chinese Indonesian 
shetuan, and most, if not all of them, are prominent businessmen such as Murdaya Poo who holds 
advisory roles in WALUBI and PSMTI, and David Herman Jaya who is the Chairman of PSMTI and an 
elder in other shetuan. Importantly, many of these entrepreneurs/community leaders are members of the 
influential Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). The majority of these prominent 
figures also hold honorary positions in various clan associations and charitable/religious organizations 
such as the Taiwan-based Tzu Chi Foundation. 
 
Such is the prominence of entrepreneurs in the leadership of Chinese Indonesian shetuan, it has become 
common knowledge that one cannot be elected as Chairman or to other prominent positions if one does 
not have strong financial and business clout. As many scholars have noted, this is of course quite common 
practice in shetuan all over the global Chinese diaspora where historically, wealthy businessmen also 
serve as community leaders and what Liu terms ‘neo-kapitans’.28  
 
It must be remembered that even during assimilation under the New Order, Chinese Indonesian tycoons 
such as Liem Sioe Liong and Djuhar Sutanto held honorary leadership positions within local and 
transnational clan and qiaoxiang-based shetuan. As respected neo-kapitans, wealthy businessmen benefit 
from increased social status at three different levels: the local Chinese community, the transnational 
network of Overseas Chinese shetuan and business networks, and among government officials and 
business communities in China. This increased social and symbolic capital would explain why Chinese 
Indonesian entrepreneurs who are already rich in their own right would dedicate time, effort and financial 
resources to extensive shetuan activities. 
 
Furthermore, while it is true that many of these entrepreneurs commit to shetuan for sentimental reasons 
of wanting to ensure Chinese cultural and political survival in Indonesia, the economic benefit of having 
social capital and close links with political leaders both in China and in Indonesia cannot be denied. Many 
Chinese Indonesian shetuan leaders have vast business interests in China and those who do not already 
have business links in China often harbor aspirations to do so. As will be discussed more extensively 
later, contact with China and other Overseas Chinese shetuan provide invaluable opportunities for local 
Chinese entrepreneurs to both promote their business and to be known as the point people for visiting 
Chinese trade delegations that come to Indonesia seeking to invest. The same potential economic 
incentive also motivates younger rank-and-file members to join newer shetuan such as PERPIT and ICBC 
and endorse the senior leadership. Without ignoring the fact that some are also motivated by sentimental 
  
 
reasons to do with preserving/promoting Chinese Indonesian culture, these younger (and often aspiring) 
entrepreneurs are mostly motivated by what they see as an opportunity to forge new business partnerships 
and to receive the mentorship of the elders. Indeed, at events such as the INTI annual general meeting or 
Chinese New Year celebrations held by various shetuan, younger members could be seen flocking around 
elders such as Rachman Hakim or Didi Dawis to give them their business cards and get known. 
 
In many ways, Chinese Indonesian shetuan have had to change to accommodate new socio-political 
situations, both internally and externally. If immediately after May ‘98, Chinese Indonesian associations 
needed to fulfill a more political role to ensure greater recognition and representation in the post-Suharto 
era, nowadays, they are less needed politically, and are required by their members to fulfill more 
commercial and cultural brokerage roles. This is amplified by a feeling that exists among many that 
Chinese Indonesians need to ‘catch up’ to their transnational counterparts and make up for the ‘lost’ 
assimilation years where they could not so freely express their Chinese identity. 
 
This is why, increasingly, the leadership of Chinese Indonesian associations are becoming more like the 
leadership of other transnational Overseas Chinese shetuan, and possessing what Liu identified as the 
three traits of what he termed ‘globalizing shetuan’. Firstly, the shetuan engage in transnational economic 
activities with members/leaders making substantial investments outside of their nations of residence 
(especially in qiaoxiang).29 Although at present, only leaders who are prominent business tycoons have 
substantial investments in China, more junior members also aspire to expand their businesses into China 
and view their involvements in the shetuan as an important step towards achieving that goal. Secondly, 
Liu argues that shetuan leadership is characterized by multiple identities where leaders pledge allegiance 
towards their residing nations while also displaying cultural and emotional affinity with their ancestral 
homes. However, here the author contends that, while this is mostly true among Chinese Indonesian 
elders, the younger generation are much less driven by sentimental values towards China and more 
motivated by potentially profitable guanxi ties. Lastly, Liu points out that global shetuan are marked by a 
significant degree of interlocking directorship that reinforces reciprocity and personal networking among 
transnational entrepreneurs. As illustrated, this is certainly a trend that has become much more prevalent 
and visible among Chinese Indonesian associations. 
 
Re-Sinification and its Discontents 
 
The changes that have occurred within Chinese Indonesian associations are not without their harsh critics. 
Over the years, the transition from leaders who are more politically oriented to those who are more 
commercially focused has caused some members to leave the associations. This is seen most clearly in 
INTI’s leadership, where, in the past, its leaders have included men who were ardent advocates of 
Chinese Indonesian rights, such as Eddie Lembong and Benny Setiono. Both men came from peranakan 
backgrounds, and while Mr Lembong is a successful pharmaceutical entrepreneur, both he and Mr 
Setiono focused almost solely on socio-political activism in the aftermath of May ‘98 and did not engage 
with much transnational networking activities. The prevalence of predominantly totok leaders with 
transnational business interests has strengthened the perception that associations like INTI have forgotten 
their original goal of promoting the harmonious integration of Chinese Indonesians. 
  
 
 
However, the biggest points of contestation thus far revolve around the associations’ growing closeness 
with China, influential members’ cultural re-orientation towards Chinese culture, and the increasing use 
of Mandarin as lingua franca in public events. There is certainly an understandable pragmatism at play 
here where, with the rise of China, Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs (particularly the younger ones) 
become more eager to use their Chinese ethnicity, clan/qiaoxiang connections and Mandarin language 
skills as advantages in trade dealings with China. Here, it is important not to understate this cultural re-
orientation as a ‘mere’ linguistic shift to Mandarin. The increase in the mainstream popularity of 
Mandarin among both Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians in recent years can be attributed to a number 
of factors, such as the obvious lure of China’s rise, the availability of Mandarin courses at schools and 
universities, and the growing number of Indonesian students that pursue higher-degree education in 
Mainland China or Taiwan. However, for many members of Chinese Indonesian shetuan, speaking 
Mandarin is an important—if not fundamental—part of the process of becoming ‘more Chinese’ as a 
social and symbolic capital. Speaking Mandarin during shetuan events and among other esteemed 
Mandarin-speakers (such as fellow businessmen from China or other Overseas Chinese communities) 
therefore also becomes a show of prestige and elite ethno-linguistic solidarity. 
 
In the last five years in particular, many events organized by various shetuan were conducted bilingually 
in Indonesian and Mandarin. This is particularly so at events designed to welcome trade or governmental 
delegations from China. Even when events are not conducted in Mandarin, promotional materials and 
stage backgrounds for events are now written both in Indonesian and simplified Chinese characters. This 
situation has caused discontent among association members who do not speak Mandarin, especially those 
from peranakan background. Windu,30 a senior member of a shetuan who cannot speak Mandarin and is 
from a peranakan background, complains that more and more, non-Mandarin speaking members feel 
isolated and excluded from association events: 
 
I think it is worrying that Chinese Indonesian associations now have a lot of their events 
conducted solely in Mandarin. More than anything else, we are an Indonesian organization, why 
conduct the events in Mandarin? We are not in China … This [the use of Mandarin] alienates a 
lot of members like myself who do not speak Mandarin, and it also does not look good in the eyes 
of the pribumi. They [the pribumi] are going to wonder what we are talking about, and they are 
going to think that now the Chinese are free, they are going to speak in their own language … 
Now associations also race against each other to invite the Chinese Ambassador and other 
officials to their events. The main focus now is to get in China’s good books! 
 
This kind of internal discontent is typical among non-Mandarin speaking members and among those who 
worry about a potential backlash over Chinese Indonesians’ closeness with China. 
 
It has to be remembered that, although Sino–Indonesian relations are at an all-time high, there is still an 
underlying residual suspicion among many pribumi that Chinese Indonesians act as China’s ‘fifth 
column’ in Indonesia. Furthermore, as reflected in Windu’s complaint, the phenomenon of re-Sinification 
that is currently happening has caused concerns that Chinese Indonesian shetuan are losing their identity 
  
 
and increasingly only serving the interests of the totok business elite. Additionally, there is a legitimate 
concern among elders of ethno-linguistic based shetuan such as Hokkien, Hakka and Teochew clan 
associations that, eventually, Mandarin will be the dominant language of Chinese Indonesian identity 
politics and other Chinese languages will disappear from public use. Eddy Djuandi, a speaker of Hokkien 
who is also the former Chairman of the North Sumatran chapter of PSMTI, admits that there is a worry 
that the prominence of Mandarin will result in the decreased use of Hokkien, even in a Hokkien-speaking 
Chinese community like in Medan. However, Mr Djuandi also concedes that it is in the interest of 
Chinese Indonesians to continue using Mandarin and ride on the momentum of China’s global rise. After 
all, Mr Djuandi argues, ‘Putonghua is the language of China, and as Chinese, we have to be able to be 
able to speak it too’.31  
 
Connecting with China and the Global Network of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations 
 
Indeed, the ability to speak Mandarin, a sense of shared Chinese identity, qiaoxiang/clan ties and vast 
transnational business networks, have made Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs and shetuan a valuable 
asset in Sino–Indonesian relations. From the perspective of China, having huaqiao compatriots from 
Indonesia who are eager to engage in mutual commercial investments and connect with China both 
culturally and sentimentally is extremely advantageous, and the Chinese government goes to lengths to 
honor the continued ‘service’ of prominent Overseas Chinese with close links to China.32 During the 
author’s visit to the offices of Leo Chandra, a senior electronic goods entrepreneur from totok background 
who is an elder in INTI and other shetuan, he proudly displayed a number of medals and plaques from the 
Chinese government awarded to honor his long-term service towards promoting good relations between 
China and Indonesia since the 1980s. Mr Chandra has many links with Chinese government officials at 
both national and provincial levels, and is often invited by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the 
State Council (qiaoban) to visit China and attend annual world Overseas Chinese meetings in Beijing and 
other cities. Likewise, in the Medan office of Eddy Djuandi, a large framed photo of him with President 
Xi Jinping and other Indonesians at a worldwide Overseas Chinese shetuan convention in Beijing is 
displayed at a prominent position. Both Mr Chandra and Mr Djuandi have cordial relations with senior 
officials at the Chinese embassy and qiaoban, and these officials often consult the men on matters to do 
with Sino–Indonesian relations. 
 
This situation is certainly not unique among prominent Chinese Indonesian businessmen and shetuan 
leaders, and indeed the Chinese government is actively encouraging increased closeness between China 
and Chinese Indonesians as huaqiao. During his diplomatic visit to Indonesia in October 2013 to mark a 
‘new era’ of Sino–Indonesian partnership,33 President Xi Jinping attended a number of meetings and 
luncheons with the Indonesian Business Community where the vast majority of those in attendance were 
Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs. In these meetings, President Xi reportedly stressed the importance of 
Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese business community as a ‘bridge’ (qiáo) that connects Indonesia and China.34 
This metaphor of a ‘bridge’ is the same rhetoric senior Chinese government officials have emphasized in 
their addresses and policies towards Overseas Chinese communities worldwide since the 1970s.35 For 
instance, in his address to the 2011 China Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs Association (COCEA) 
Conference in Beijing, then Vice President Xi Jinping expressed his wishes for Overseas Chinese to 
continue to immerse themselves in the local host society and act as a bridge that facilitates the mutual 
understanding and friendship between China and other countries. In the same occasion, Overseas Chinese 
  
 
were asked to make a contribution to the further economic cooperation between China and other 
countries, the Chinese nation’s rejuvenation, and improvements in understanding and friendship between 
China and other countries.36  
 
Among Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs and shetuan members themselves, this metaphor of Overseas 
Chinese as a bridge is also an important one for their self-image. The view that they now play a 
significant bridging/mediating role in the burgeoning Sino–Indonesian relations is one that inspires pride, 
especially when bilateral trade figures between China and Indonesia are set to exceed US$80 billion by 
2015. Speaking in his capacity as Vice President of PERPIT, Rachman Hakim contends that Chinese 
Indonesians are currently at an unprecedented strategic position to ‘do good’ for the sake of Indonesia: 
 
Chinese Indonesians today have the opportunity to be the mediator that connects China and 
Indonesia in economy and culture. We know both languages, we have business connections in 
both countries, and we are trusted by both governments. Even President Xi Jinping himself said 
that Chinese Indonesians are like a beautiful bridge [qiáoliang] for China and Indonesia … We 
[Chinese Indonesians] should be proud of this, because this is a great opportunity to serve our 
country. If we can bring Chinese investors to Indonesia and introduce Indonesian businesses to 
China, is that not good service to the country?37  
 
Mr Hakim adds that particularly with China’s vision of the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road that 
will see significant Chinese investment and infrastructure building in Indonesia, Chinese Indonesians 
need to play an even bigger bridging role. 
 
Indeed, this bridging role is central to the function of Chinese Indonesian chambers of commerce such as 
PERPIT, where hosting trade delegations from China is a big part of both their activities and expenses. 
Members of PERPIT, ICBC and INTI reveal that each month there would be several visits from Chinese 
provincial trade delegations, not only from traditional qiaoxiang provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong 
where the majority of Chinese Indonesians originated from, but also from Henan, Jiangsu and even as far 
north as Liaoning. Such is the importance of Chinese Indonesian shetuan as the contact point for Chinese 
trade delegations, that Indonesian government bureaucrats have been known to complain that the Chinese 
would by-pass official trade channels and deal directly with Chinese Indonesian shetuan.38 In regards to 
this, Rachman Hakim repeats the popularly held belief that Chinese counterparts prefer to deal directly 
with fellow Chinese ethnics because ‘we have a common culture and we understand each other better’.39  
 
There is certainly not a small degree of what Aihwa Ong calls ‘the homogenizing ideologies of Chinese 
racial and cultural essences’ or ‘self-Orientalizing moves’ in how Chinese Indonesian shetuan leaders and 
members act and present themselves in interactions with Chinese government and trade delegates.40 
Along with using Mandarin as the lingua franca, clan and qiaoxiang links as well as a sense of Chinese 
common culture need to be emphasized as part of the strategy to accentuate one’s Chineseness. This is 
why mutual visits to Indonesia and China usually also feature cultural performances, elaborate feasts and 
visits to ancestral sites of pilgrimage (in the case of visits to China). In such events and spaces, Chinese 
  
 
Indonesian delegates ‘perform’ their Chineseness as a way of creating a sense of primordial affinity, 
much in the same way as they also accentuate their Indonesianness through acts such as wearing the 
traditional batik cloth, singing the national anthem and speaking in Indonesian when dealing with 
Indonesian government officials and publics. Indeed, this strategic display of cultural/ethnic identity is an 
important part of Chinese Indonesians’ bridging and cultural brokerage roles. 
 
As Liu points out, perhaps nowhere else is this self-essentializing Chinese discourse more evident than 
during large international gatherings of Overseas Chinese clan/qiaoxiang-based shetuan, such as the 
Teochew or Fuqingese International Conventions, as well as commercial-based ones such as the biennial 
World Chinese Entrepreneur Convention.41 At these events, national differences are set aside for the 
homogenizing discourse of common Chineseness that is unified further by the desire to participate in 
China’s rise as a global power. Such events play an important part in the creation of a sense of imagined 
community of Chinese transnational guanxi networks, and this is a mode of belonging that has become 
increasingly attractive to Chinese Indonesians. More and more, Chinese Indonesian shetuan are making 
moves to more actively participate and play a bigger role in regional and global Overseas Chinese 
voluntary association and entrepreneur consortiums. A testament to this is the fact that the 2015 World 
Chinese Entrepreneur’s Convention will be held in Bali, Indonesia after successful (and expensive) 
lobbying by PERPIT. This trend suggests that Chinese Indonesian associations are embracing a more 
transnational pan-Chinese identity where the focus is no longer just on local Chinese politics in Indonesia. 
 
Conclusion: The Paradox of Re-Sinification? 
 
This article has demonstrated how Chinese Indonesian voluntary associations are now more 
institutionalized, concerted and international-focused in their efforts to assert their position as trade and 
cultural brokers in the burgeoning trade and bilateral relations between China and Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the article highlights how recent changes in the leadership, cultural orientation and activities 
of Chinese Indonesian shetuan point towards a trend for re-Sinification and the forging of closer ties with 
China. The article discussed how re-Sinification among members of Chinese Indonesian voluntary 
associations is motivated by a number of interrelated internal and external factors. Internally, the 
sentimental desire to belong and ‘reconnect’ with Chinese culture came after decades of assimilation 
under the New Order. The post-Suharto momentum of Chinese Indonesian identity politics has also 
enabled greater public expression of Chinese identity and increased use of Mandarin. Externally, the rise 
of China as a regional and global power has led to the desire among Chinese Indonesians to capitalize on 
their Chinese ethnicity as social capital to strengthen guanxi networks both with China and the 
transnational Overseas Chinese trade network. At the same time, bilateral relations between China and 
Indonesia have never been better, which means that Chinese Indonesians’ roles as cultural, linguistic and 
commercial brokers between the two countries are also more important than ever. 
 
However, the article also critically analyzed the potential dangers of re-Sinification among the Chinese in 
Indonesia. For one, the trend towards Sinification and closer ties with China has created gaps between the 
totok and peranakan groups, those who speak Mandarin and those who do not, the business elite and 
others, and the older and younger generations. If at the beginning of the post-Suharto era, Chinese 
  
 
Indonesian shetuan played a much greater advocacy role that represented most, if not all, Chinese 
Indonesians, nowadays they are dominant totok business elites who possess both the capital and influence 
to put forward their own cultural and commercial agenda. Many outside of this exclusive group have 
expressed discontent over the associations’ new direction, and these internal divisions may widen even 
further in the future. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that there are worries within the ethnic Chinese 
community (particularly the peranakan group) about a potential backlash from the pribumi if the Chinese 
are seen to be too close to China indicates that there are still negative ideological connotations in 
Indonesia about China and the loyalty of Chinese Indonesians. Even now, there are frequent attacks in the 
media by various right wing and Islamist pribumi groups that accuse Chinese Indonesian businessmen 
and politicians of being China’s puppets in Indonesia. Considering the turbulent history of anti-Chinese 
discrimination and Sino–Indonesian relations, such concerns are both warranted and should be taken into 
serious consideration. 
 
Despite these worries, leaders of Chinese Indonesian associations are mostly optimistic about their role as 
a ‘bridge’ in Sino–Indonesian relations and see no inherent contradictions between their close links to 
China and loyalty towards Indonesia. If anything, there seems to be a consensus among shetuan leaders 
that the time is right for Chinese Indonesians to utilize their Chinese ethnicity, language and culture as 
valuable assets that benefit all parties involved (the Chinese government, Indonesian government and the 
Chinese associations themselves). There is also a common rationale here that the more important Chinese 
Indonesians are for the relationship between China and Indonesia, the more secure their socio-political 
position in Indonesia will be. While this assumption may seem simplistic or even naïve considering 
Chinese Indonesians’ problematic past, it is certainly a bet that most Chinese Indonesian shetuan are 
making. 
 
The situation in Indonesia shows how despite decades of assimilation, Chinese voluntary associations are 
still very much relevant in the Chinese Indonesian community, particularly among the business/merchant 
class. It continues to be important today (if not even more so) and thus confirms the significance of 
Chinese associations as one of the ‘pillars’ of Overseas Chinese communities. The case study of Chinese 
Indonesians is important for the study of the globalization shetuan in Chinese diaspora because the 
structure, institutionalization and activities of contemporary voluntary organizations in Indonesia are 
increasingly becoming similar to those in other major Chinese diaspora. This must be viewed in 
conjunction with greater transnational connections in Chinese press, media, education and popular 
culture. Here, the author argues that Indonesia’s Chinese are now more integrated into Overseas Chinese 
networks and modes of identification that are inexorably tied to the rise of China. 
 
Furthermore, while the situation of post-assimilation Chinese identity revival in Indonesia is unique, the 
case study of re-Sinification among Chinese Indonesians provides a compelling example of how Chinese 
ethnicity and identity have become valuable social and symbolic capital in the light of China’s rise. Here, 
further analysis of the different motivations, interpretations and implications of re-Sinification, not just in 
Indonesia but also in the global Overseas Chinese communities, is needed. Similarly, there needs to be a 
closer examination of how the Chinese state’s policy and soft-power efforts towards Overseas Chinese 
both shape and are shaped by diaspora dynamics abroad. 
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